Japan’s Legal Readiness in the Event of Hostilities on the Korean Peninsula by Nasu, H
100     Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Japan’s  
Legal Readiness  
in the  
Event of  
Hostilities  






Japan’s Legal Readiness in the Event of Hostilities on the Korean Peninsula    101
Introduction
The use of military power is a controversial issue in Japan, primarily because 
of the “war renunciation clause” of the Japanese Constitution. Article 9 of the 
Constitution imposes restrictions on the extent to which the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF) can operate overseas.1 The issue of Japan’s use of armed force raised 
a public furor in 2015 when the new security bills were introduced as an attempt, 
ostensibly, to authorize the SDF to act in “collective” self-defense as a means to 
strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.2 Despite the public outcry, the new security 
legislation was enacted on September 30, 2015 and came into force on March 29, 
2016. The new legislation aimed to enable Japan to take a “seamless response” 
to any international security situation that might arise.3 In accordance with the 
“proactive contribution to peace” policy adopted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
the 2015 security legislation has achieved an overhaul of the Japanese security law 
regime that had, over time, developed as a patchwork of technical amendments and 
special legislation. Nevertheless, the security law of Japan still contains many legal 
gaps and uncertainties that prevent Japan from harnessing the full potential of the 
re-interpretation of Article 9 in the contemporary security environment.4
Since the entry into force of Japan’s new security legislation, tensions in 
Northeast Asia have significantly increased as the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (North Korea) conducted aggressive missile and nuclear tests in 2017, while 
the U.S. President Donald Trump continued to post provocative messages alluding 
to the possibility of resorting to military action. Any eruption of hostilities on the 
Korean Peninsula—whether it be a small-scale “bloody nose” attack or full-blown 
warfare—will test Japan’s legal readiness under its overhauled security law regime, 
as well as its defense capabilities and the robustness of its emergency planning. 
This paper examines how the U.S.-Japan alliance operates within the legal 
framework for the use of force in terms of both international law and Japanese 
security law, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. 
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After providing a brief review of the legal and political developments relevant to 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula, this paper outlines the legal framework for the 
use of force by the SDF. It then critically examines Japan’s legal readiness to engage 
in combined security operations with U.S. forces, non-combatant evacuation 
operations, and maritime security operations in the event of hostilities on the 
Peninsula. 
Legal and Political Developments  
relating to Security Tensions  
on the Korean Peninsula
Security tensions on the Korean Peninsula have primarily evolved around two 
inter-related military concerns: (i) the development of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons; and (ii) North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program has been an international concern since the country’s 
announcement of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons in 1993.5 Given the potential of ballistic missile systems to 
deliver nuclear, chemical or biological payloads,6 the level of global concern has 
increased considerably since July 2006 when North Korea began engaging in 
multiple ballistic missile launches. 
Condemning the nuclear test conducted on October 9, 2006 as “a clear 
threat to international peace and security”, the UN Security Council demanded 
that North Korea suspend and abandon all activities related to its ballistic 
missile program and all nuclear weapons programs in a complete, verifiable and 
irreversible manner,7 imposing sanctions in relation to specific items.8 On June 
12, 2009, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 calling upon all states 
to inspect vessels on the high seas, with the consent of the flag state, in the event 
that vessels are suspected of violating the obligations imposed under the sanctions 
regime.9 A series of UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements 
have subsequently been issued each time North Korea conducted a nuclear test or 
a ballistic missile launch, reaffirming the obligations imposed upon North Korea in 
the previous resolutions and occasionally reinforcing the sanctions regime that has 
been built against it.10 
The cause of tensions on the Korean Peninsula is not limited to armament 
issues alone. The hostile relationship between North Korea, the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea) and Japan continues to pose a threat to the region. On May 
27, 2009, North Korea announced that it would no longer be bound by the 1953 
Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War. Even though the announcement 
was not considered sufficient to give rise to a resumption of an armed conflict,11 
it heralded a period of renewed hostilities. North Korea allegedly launched an 
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attack on March 26, 2010 which led to the sinking of the South Korean Navy 
vessel Cheonan with the tragic loss of 46 lives.12 In November 2010, the island 
of Yeonpyeong near the disputed maritime border was bombarded, leaving two 
civilians and two soldiers dead. In August 2015, South Korea accused North Korea 
of planting land mines that injured two South Korean soldiers, which triggered an 
exchange of artillery fire in the demilitarized zone. 
In addition, the humanitarian crisis facing North Korea has been a 
growing concern, with chronic malnutrition and systematic, widespread and grave 
violations of human rights drawing the attention of the international community.13 
The crisis presents a precarious situation for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
because of the possible mass influx of refugees across the border into the PRC 
in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. For Japan, the repatriation 
of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea remains an important political 
consideration. 
Tensions escalated rapidly in 2017 when North Korea was reported to have 
been edging close to acquiring the capability to launch a nuclear attack against 
the U.S. and President Trump threatened to unleash “fire and fury” against North 
Korea. The crisis was defused when North Korea made a historic commitment 
in 2018 to work towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.14 
However, the situation remains precarious due to the sluggish and difficult process 
of political negotiations, with the persistent risk that a breakdown in negotiations 
could potentially lead to military confrontation.
The Legal Framework for the  
Use of Force by the Self-Defense Forces
The operation of the SDF is subject to constraints under international law as 
well as Japanese domestic law, in particular under Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution. The use of force or threat of force is prohibited under international 
law,15 which is reflected in Article 9(1) of the Constitution. There are two exceptions 
to this principle under international law: (i) the authorization of the use of force 
by the United Nations; and (ii) the exercise of the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense. 
While the Japanese Constitution does not explicitly recognize these 
exceptions, the “war-renunciation” clause must be interpreted in light of the 
applicable rules of international law, including the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States,16 as prescribed 
under Article 98(2) of the Constitution.17 This means that notwithstanding the 
constitutional commitment not to maintain land, sea, and air forces, or other war 
potential under Article 9(2) of the Constitution, the clause must be read to allow 
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the SDF to engage in the use of force under United Nations authorization or in 
the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, so long 
as such force is limited to the minimum extent necessary to implement the UN 
mandate or to repel armed attacks. In other words, Article 9 of the Constitution 
does not entirely deprive Japan of justifications for the use of force available under 
international law, but rather limits the way in which, and the extent to which, the 
nation may engage in the use of force. 
Under Japanese domestic law, the legislative bases for resorting to the use 
of armed force are restricted due to Article 9 of the Constitution. The primary 
legislative basis for resorting to the use of armed force is codified in Article 76 of 
the Law concerning the Self-Defense Forces (SDF Law),18 which authorizes the 
prime minister to direct deployment of SDF units in the event of an armed attack 
against Japan (i.e., an exercise of national defense power). Amendments introduced 
by the 2015 security legislation have expanded the scope of Japan’s national defense 
power in cases where an armed attack occurs against a country that has a close 
relationship with Japan and, as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear 
danger that fundamentally undermines the lives and freedoms of its nationals and 
their right to pursue happiness (i.e., when there is an existential threat to Japan).19 
In exercising the national defense power, the prime minister may authorize 
the SDF to use armed force to the extent necessary to defend the nation in 
accordance with Article 88 of the SDF Law.20 The Defense Against an Armed 
Attack Law establishes procedural requirements that must be met in order for the 
prime minister to exercise this national defense power.21
The official Japanese government position that has traditionally been 
adopted is that an overseas deployment of SDF units for the purposes of the use of 
force in a foreign territory, its territorial sea or the airspace above it, is prohibited 
under the Constitution.22 This is because such action generally goes beyond the 
minimum level of force necessary for self-defense.23 Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed 
this official position at the Budget Committee of the House of Counsellors on 
August 24, 2015, stating that the SDF’s participation in combat operations in a 
foreign territory would amount to an overseas deployment prohibited under the 
Constitution.24 This excludes the SDF’s participation in the theater of combat in 
and around the Korean Peninsula in the exercise of the right of self-defense when 
hostilities have erupted.
This does not mean, however, that Japan is constitutionally prohibited from 
defending or assisting U.S. forces in the exercise of the right of collective self-
defense. Upon the adoption of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 the official 
position of the Japanese government was essentially that Japan had the right of 
collective self-defense, but its exercise involving the use of force to defend other 
countries on foreign soil would exceed the minimum level of force necessary for 
self-defense.25 In other words, Article 9 of the Constitution does not necessarily 
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prohibit Japan from exercising the right of self-defense as the legal basis for 
justifying SDF action in and around Japan to defend the U.S. and its interests when 
an armed attack occurs against the latter. The minimum level of force required 
for self-defense is not a static concept, but evolves over time as the geopolitical 
climate and technological capabilities change. In situations where the defense 
system of two nations is integrated to the extent that the survival of either nation 
is interdependent on the other’s defense capabilities, it naturally follows that the 
line between individual and collective self-defense becomes blurred. Thus, the 2015 
security legislation aimed to clarify that the SDF is not precluded from engaging in 
the use of force to defend and assist U.S. forces, including on the high seas—which 
are outside the jurisdiction of any foreign state. 
Also, in cases where UN Command is engaged with a resumption of 
hostilities on the Korean Peninsula,26 the Constitutional restriction does not 
prevent Japan from authorizing the deployment of the SDF. Japan indeed enacted 
special legislation to provide support activities in the Indian Ocean for military 
operations in Afghanistan and to engage in humanitarian and reconstruction 
support activities in Iraq.27 
Prior to making such a decision, however, questions might arise as to 
whether the U.S. assets in Japan can be deployed without prior consultation with 
Japan under the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.28 Notwithstanding 
Japan’s official position ostensibly to the contrary, there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the U.S. does not believe prior consultation is required for the use 
of its military facilities and equipment in Japan, in the event of hostilities on the 
Korean Peninsula.29 In any event, neither party to a bilateral treaty can be bound 
by any particular interpretation unless the other party is fully aware of such an 
interpretation and has accepted it as the shared understanding of the relevant 
treaty term.30
In addition, the SDF is authorized under the SDF Law to use “weapons” 
in limited circumstances. This authorization for the use of “weapons” does not 
constitute a “use of force” as an exercise of national defense power as far as 
Japanese domestic law is concerned, even though it might constitute a “use of 
force” that requires legal justification under international law. For example, the use 
of weapons is authorized when it is necessary to:
• destroy ballistic missiles directed at Japan;31
•  protect Japanese nationals and other designated foreign nationals in a 
foreign country;32
• protect individuals under the SDF’s control during a transport operation;33
• protect SDF’s defense assets;34 and
•  protect the defense assets of U.S. forces or other countries that contribute to 
the defense of Japan35 
In these situations, the legitimate use of weapons is permitted only to the 
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extent reasonable under the attendant circumstances and must not cause death or 
injury unless it can be justified as self-defense or necessity under Articles 36 and 
37 of the Criminal Code of Japan.36 Amendments introduced by the 2015 security 
legislation have expanded the scope within which the SDF personnel are authorized 
to use weapons. They are now allowed to protect not only themselves but also 
other individuals under their control or in the same compound, when engaging in 
support activities under grave circumstances affecting Japan’s peace and security 
(e.g., when Japan might be subject to an armed attack if the situation were left 
unattended, but the SDF may operate only outside combat zones).37
The decision as to which of these legislative bases might actually be used in 
the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula ultimately depends on the Japanese 
government’s assessment of the attendant circumstances and various political 
considerations. This political decision will inform the SDF of the relevant legal 
framework for action. However, as will be explained below, each of these legislative 
bases is tightly regulated due to the constitutional limitation on the use of force and 
the controversies related thereto. 
Legal Challenges in the  
Event of Hostilities on the  
Korean Peninsula
COMBINED SECURITY OPERATIONS
It is generally understood among security experts that key to the maintenance and 
enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japan’s legal readiness to effectively 
use the technological capabilities it has in a combined security operation to track 
missiles launched by North Korea.38 Under the 2015 security legislation, there are 
three different legislative bases for the protection of U.S. forces by the SDF: 
1.  the protection of U.S. defense assets, with the limited use of weapons to the 
extent reasonable under the attendant circumstances;39
2.  the protection of individuals within the SDF’s control during support activities 
under grave circumstances affecting Japan’s peace and security (e.g., when Japan 
might be subject to an armed attack if the situation were left unattended, but the 
SDF may operate only outside combat zones);40 and
3.  the authorization of the use of force in situations where an armed attack 
occurs against a country that is in a close relationship with Japan and, as a 
result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger that fundamentally 
undermines the lives and freedoms of its nationals, and their right to pursue 
happiness (i.e., when there is an existential threat to Japan).41
The first two legislative bases allow SDF personnel to use weapons to a limited 
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extent within the law enforcement paradigm. This means that weapons can only be 
used to the extent reasonable to execute their mission (e.g., the protection of U.S. 
defense assets), and such use of weapons must not result in injury or death unless 
it is justifiable as self-defense or necessity under Articles 36 and 37 of the Japanese 
Criminal Code.42 On the other hand, the third legislative basis triggers the SDF’s 
action in situations of national self-defense, with authority to use armed force to 
the extent necessary to repel armed attacks.
The first possible scenario where Japan might participate in a combined 
security operation with the U.S., in the event of hostilities on the Korean 
Peninsula, is when Japan recognizes itself as being subject to an armed attack 
or, in accordance with the new security legislation, when facing an existential 
threat resulting from an armed attack against the U.S.. Indeed, Prime Minister 
Abe observed during the 2015 Diet debate that the new security legislation would 
extend to the protection of U.S. Navy vessels from a missile attack launched by 
North Korea when those vessels form an integral part of Japan’s missile defense 
system.43 This statement indicates political readiness to invoke the national defense 
power under Article 76 of the SDF Law when hostilities on the Korean Peninsula 
threaten Japan’s missile defense system and U.S. defense assets that form an 
integral part thereof. The decision might cause domestic controversy as to whether 
the missile attack amounts to an armed attack directed against Japan or whether 
the launch poses an existential threat to Japan, but in such a scenario, it can 
legitimately be justified as an exercise of the right of national self-defense under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
The alternative scenario could arise if Japan authorizes the SDF, in 
accordance with the Law Concerning Grave Circumstances, to undertake support 
activities for armed forces of other countries that are contributing to Japan’s peace 
and security or to international peace and security. Operating within the law 
enforcement paradigm, the SDF’s actions must comply with stringent regulations 
governing the use of weapons and are prohibited in areas where combat activities 
are taking place.44 Nevertheless, during the Diet debate in August 2015, then 
Defense Minister Nakatani indicated that the SDF could defend a U.S. Navy vessel 
engaged in a combined security operation from an incoming missile attack by 
using a defensive missile under the new legislation concerning grave circumstances 
affecting Japan’s peace and security.45 
Under international law, however, such action clearly constitutes a use 
of force that requires justification based on the right of self-defense or UN 
authorization. It is widely accepted that force may be used in law enforcement 
provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary for the purpose 
of effecting the objects of law enforcement such as boarding, searching, seizing and 
bringing into port a suspected vessel.46 Defending a foreign warship goes beyond 
the strict limitation imposed upon the use of force in maritime law enforcement 
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under international law and can only be justified as an exercise of the right of 
collective self-defense or as an action under UN authorization. 
An attempt to justify the SDF’s actions to defend U.S. Navy vessels based on 
the Law Concerning Grave Circumstances thus creates a legal paradox—it is a law 
enforcement action under Japanese domestic law, but the same conduct constitutes 
a use of force under international law that requires justification as an exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense. Even though the public debate concerning the 
2015 security legislation focused on the constitutionality of the right of collective 
self-defense, the actual scope of the use of force newly authorized is so narrowly 
confined that it does not support a clear case of collective self-defense.
NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) 
Prior to and in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, Japan and the U.S., 
among many other countries, will be involved in rescue and evacuation operations 
for the relocation to a place of safety of designated non-combatants, namely their 
own nationals and other designated foreign nationals residing in South Korea. 
Although each state is responsible for the development and execution of its own 
national evacuation plan, multiple states are likely to coordinate their rescue efforts 
according to their own legal framework and operational capabilities. Coordination 
with other states will help optimize limited assets available for the evacuation of 
foreign nationals. However, the requirement of consent as the legal basis for the 
SDF’s deployment within South Korean territory would necessarily constrain the 
SDF’s ability to facilitate and carry out rescue and evacuation operations.
Japan’s legal position is that rescue and evacuation operations must be conducted 
with the consent of South Korean authorities or, alternatively, under UN 
authorization.47 In other words, the SDF’s overseas rescue missions are strictly 
prohibited without consent of the host state or UN authorization. Also, its ability 
to use weapons necessary to perform rescue and evacuation operations is restricted 
to areas where no combat is taking place.48 The United States, on the other hand, 
merely requires that “the NEO planners are aware of sovereignty of other foreign 
nations and the constraints and restraints on violating the sovereignty”.49 Under 
international law, the legality of the use of force by a state to protect its own 
nationals in a foreign state without consent of the latter is far from established, due 
to inconsistent and equivocal state practice.50
The use of force necessary to protect Japanese and foreign nationals from 
attacks or the effects of attacks is one of the critical areas in which the SDF’s ability 
to facilitate rescue and evacuation operations will be restricted unless South 
Korean authorities are prepared to provide an express consent thereto. This is a 
particularly acute area of concern for political reasons (e.g., the territorial dispute 
over Dokdo/Takeshima, among others), as well as historical reasons (e.g., Japan’s 
occupation of the Korean Peninsula and forced labour during World War II). Due 
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to these concerns, South Korea would likely be reluctant to allow the SDF to engage 
in any military operation on its soil. 
During a rescue and evacuation operation, any engagement between the 
SDF and members of North Korean forces, militia or voluntary corps, or anyone 
acting under the direction and control of the North Korean regime, would 
constitute hostilities in an international armed conflict. In such a situation, the 
SDF would be required to comply with the full range of rules under international 
humanitarian law, including the law of targeting, and would not be able to 
circumvent its obligations by asking other states to intervene. It follows that the 
SDF are under the obligation to verify legitimate military targets, to exercise all 
feasible precautions to minimize collateral damage, and to refrain from or stop 
executing an attack if it is reasonably expected to cause excessive collateral damage 
relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.51 Furthermore, 
Japan will be required to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian 
law,52 arguably with the positive obligation to take action when the SDF have the 
capabilities and opportunities to prevent or stop war crimes being committed.53 
As such, the SDF cannot disregard relevant rules of international law applicable to 
an international armed conflict, even if they participate in rescue and evacuation 
operations with the consent of South Korean authorities. These rules apply in 
parallel to Japanese domestic law regulating the conduct of the SDF and within 
the parameters of the consent provided by South Korean authorities. These legal 
complexities, as well as associated legal risks, must be carefully assessed before the 
deployment of the SDF to complex operational environments that are expected to 
develop during rescue and evacuation operations.
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS
The maritime domain is likely to be another major theater in which the SDF must 
operate. In the event of hostilities, civilians and defectors are likely to flee hostilities 
in large numbers by seeking refuge through maritime routes or by crossing the 
border into the PRC. Among those fleeing could be North Korean operatives on a 
covert mission to sabotage search and rescue operations at sea or infiltrate South 
Korean or Japanese territories. Depending on how the PRC and Russia engage with 
such hostilities, their navy vessels could be present in the vicinity of the maritime 
routes used by asylum seekers. These factors complicate the maritime conditions 
under which SDF vessels might be required to operate in facilitating the evacuation 
of Japanese and foreign nationals or their protection from hostilities.
First, the SDF could face a situation where the obligation to assist people in 
distress arises under the law of the sea or international human rights law. Japan has 
ratified the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, which requires the master of a ship to 
render assistance to persons in distress.54 Japan is also a party to the International 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which arguably imposes on it positive 
obligations to protect the right to life at sea within its jurisdiction.55 Depending on 
how wide the scope of jurisdiction is interpreted for the purposes of applying the 
Covenant, the SDF may be required to protect the human rights of any individuals 
with whom it comes into contact at sea, for example, those on board any ships 
which SDF personnel visit and search to verify their nationality.56 These obligations 
include non-refoulement when there are substantial grounds to believe that the 
relevant individuals would face a real risk of being persecuted or subject to torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment upon return. 
Second, further complication might arise when hostile actors, with the 
intent to engage in subversive activities and disrupt evacuation operations, disguise 
themselves as asylum seekers or civilians on merchant vessels. SDF vessels may be 
authorized to inspect foreign-flagged ships, with the consent of the flag state, when 
the situation is recognized as constituting grave circumstances affecting Japan.57 
Alternatively, the SDF may be authorized to use armed force in the exercise of 
national defense power under Articles 76 and 88 of the SDF Law in response to 
an armed attack directed against Japan or its close ally. Yet, the application of 
national defense power to maritime security operations in such a scenario depends 
upon whether subversive activities form part of the larger context of the armed 
attack to which the SDF are responding. Likewise, the applicability of international 
humanitarian law in such a scenario also depends on whether the subversive 
activities form part of the larger context of hostilities. When their identity or link 
to the larger context of hostilities is unclear, the SDF would face a legal “grey zone” 
due to uncertainty as to which body of international law applies to the use of force 
(including weapons) and to the treatment of hostile actors who are captured.58 
Third, Article 9 of the Constitution restricts the ways in which the SDF 
may engage in hostilities in the maritime context. The explicit denial of the right 
of belligerency in the second paragraph of the war-renunciation clause imposes 
not only stricter requirements on the justification for the use of force (under jus ad 
bellum) but also precludes Japan from engaging in certain types of belligerent acts 
that are traditionally permitted for the navy (under jus in bello). Therefore, without 
prejudice to any UN-authorized maritime enforcement operations, there are 
constitutional limitations on the extent to which the SDF may participate in naval 
operations such as naval blockade, interdiction of neutral ships, seizure of enemy 
ships, or employing naval mines in foreign territorial waters.59
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Conclusion
In the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, there will be many scenarios 
where Japan is required to consider use of force options—such as defending U.S. 
navy vessels engaged in combined security operations, protecting Japanese and 
foreign nationals during rescue and evacuation operations, and engaging in various 
maritime security operations—either by stretching the meaning of an existential 
threat or by an expansive reading of the permitted use of weapons during support 
activities within the law enforcement paradigm. The benefit of such an attempt 
to stretch the legislative grounds for justifying specific use of physical force 
must be weighed against its political, diplomatic, constitutional and operational 
ramifications. As examined above, the constraints of the legislative framework limit 
Japan’s legal options to justify the use of force in prosecuting various missions in 
the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. 
Even though the 2015 security legislation aimed to enable Japan to adopt a 
“seamless response” to contemporary security threats, it did not go far enough to 
address the inherent gap in Japan’s security law regime so as to allow the SDF to 
employ armed force as necessary in a variety of settings. This problem is not unique 
to SDF’s operations in and around the Korean Peninsula, but applies equally to 
hostilities in Taiwan and other parts of Asia. For the U.S.-Japan alliance to remain 
as the anchor of regional security in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. and Japanese defense 
agencies will have to work together to develop a mutual understanding of legally 
defensible options for each country in a wide range of operational scenarios that are 
expected to arise in the event of hostilities in the region. 
Hitoshi Nasu joined the Exeter Law School in January 2018. Prior to his current 
appointment, he taught at Australian National University, where he was Co-
Director of the Centre for Military and Security Law and the Australian Network for 
Japanese Law. Currently, he is also an adjunct senior fellow of S. Rajaratnam School 
of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and 
managing co-director of the Woomera Manual Project on the International Law of 
of international security law issues, such as collective security, peacekeeping, the 
security, cyber security, human security, national security and the protection of state 
secrets, regional security, disaster relief and management, security institutions and 
over 70 scholarly publications.
112     Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
1   Article 9 of the Constitution reads: “(1) 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation and the threat or use 
of force as means of settling international 
disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim 
of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be maintained. The right of belliger-
Constitution of Japan, art. 9.
2   Cabinet Bill No. 72 of the 189th Diet 
(Japan); Cabinet Bill No. 73 of the 189th Diet 
(Japan).
3   Law No. 76 of 2015 (Japan); Law No. 77 
of 2015 (Japan).
4   For the author’s analysis of the 2015 
security legislation, see Hitoshi Nasu, Japan’s 
2015 Security Legislation: Challenges to its 
Implementation under International Law, 92 
Int’l L. Stud. 249 (2016).
5   Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 
161. See also Int’l Atomic Energy Agency 
[IAEA], Report of the Implementation of the 
Agreement between the Agency and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for 
the Application of Safeguards in connection 
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. Gov/2636 
(Feb. 25, 1993). 
6   S.C. Res. 1695, pmbl. ¶ 4 (July 15, 2006).
7   S.C. Res. 1718, ¶¶ 5–7 (Oct. 14, 2006).
8   Id., ¶ 8.
9   S.C. Res. 1874, ¶¶ 11–13 (June 12, 2009).
10   See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2397 (Dec. 22, 2017); 
S.C. Res. 2375 (Sep. 11, 2017); S.C. Res. 
2371 (Aug. 5, 2017); S.C. Res. 2321 (Nov. 
30, 2016); S.C. Res. 2270 (Mar. 2, 2016); S.C. 
Res. 2094 (Mar. 7, 2013); S.C. Res. 2087 (Jan. 
22, 2013); Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2012/13 
(Apr. 16, 2012).
11   For commentaries, see Dapo Akande, 
The Korean War Has Resumed!! (Or So 
We Are Told), EJIL: Talk! (July 22, 2009), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-korean-war-has-
resumed-or-so-we-are-told/; Seunghyum 
Sally Nam, Has North Korea Terminated 
the Korean Armistice Agreement?, EJIL: 
Talk! (July 24, 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
has-north-korea-terminated-the-korean-armi-
stice-agreement/. 
12   See Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2010/13 
(July 9, 2010).
13   See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (Feb. 7, 2014).
14   The White House, Joint Statement of 
President Donald J Trump of the United 
States of America and Chairman Kim Jong 
Un of the Democratic People’s Repub-






Repub. of Kor. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 




15   U.N. Charter art. 2(4). Its status as cus-
by the International Court of Justice in Mili-
tary and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14, ¶¶ 99–101, 188–90 (June 27).
16   Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Se-
curity Between the United States of America 
and Japan, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 
U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 4509.
17   Article 98(2) of the Constitution reads: 
“The treaties concluded by Japan and 
established laws of nations shall be faithfully 
observed.” Constitution of Japan, art. 98(2). 
Japan’s Legal Readiness in the Event of Hostilities on the Korean Peninsula    113
This by no means suggests any normative 
hierarchy between international law and 
Japanese domestic law, but simply provides 
a constitutional basis for the interpretative 
principle. See Hitoshi Nasu, Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution: Revisited in the Light 
of International Law, 19 J. Japanese L. 50 
(2004). 
18   Law No. 165 of 1954 (Japan) [hereinafter 
SDF Law].
19   Law No. 76 of 2015, supra note 3, arts. 
1, 5.
20   The use of armed force must comply 
with the relevant rules and customs of 
international law and must not exceed what 
is considered reasonable under the attendant 
circumstances. SDF Law, supra note 18, art. 
88(2).
21   Law No. 79 of 2003 (Japan).
22   Resolution against Overseas Deploy-
ment of the Self-Defence Forces, adopted 
at the House of Councillors, 19th Diet Sess. 
(1954).
23   See Takeshi Nakano (仲野武志), Buryoku 
武力行
使・武器使用の法的規制 (二)) [The Legal Reg-
ulation of the Use of Force/ Use of Weapons 
(II)], 93(10) Jichi Kenkyu (自治研究) [Autono-
my Stud.] 49, 56–57 (2017). 
24   Remarks before the Budget Committee 
of the House of Counsellors, 189th Diet Sess. 
(Aug. 24, 2015).
25   See, e.g., Prime Minister Nobusuke 
Kishi, Remarks before the Special Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives on 
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Other 
Proceedings, No. 21, at 27, 31, 33–34, (Apr. 
20, 1960); Remarks before the Budget Com-
mittee of the House of Councillors, 34th Diet 
at 24, 27 (Mar. 31, 1960); Masami Takatsuji, 
Dir. of Cabinet Legislative Bureau, Remarks 
before the Budget Committee of the House 
of Proceedings, No. 5, at 12 (Mar. 5, 1969). 
-
right of collective self-defense more general-
ly, but without clarifying whether the exercise 
of the right envisaged is limited to overseas 
deployment or more broadly includes 
assistance in and around Japan. See, e.g., 
House Member Seiichi Inaba (May 29, 1981). 
See also 鈴木尊紘
憲法第9条と
集団的自衛権) [Article 9 of the Constitution 
and the Right of Collective Self-Defence], 11 
Reference 2, 37–40 (2011); Kiyoshi Sakaguchi 
(坂口規純
Kaishaku no Keisei to Tenkai (I) (集団的自衛
権に関する政府解釈の形成と展開 (上)) [The 
Formation and Development of Govern-
ment Interpretation Regarding the Right of 
Self-Defence (I)], 1330 Gaikou Jihou (外交時
報) [Dipl. Rev.] 70, 79–84 (1996).
26   The U.N. Command in Korea has 
continued to operate since its establishment 
under S.C. Res. 84, ¶ 3 (July 7, 1950) to 
preserve the 1953 Armistice Agreement and 
to maintain control of U.N. Forces. Sixteen 
nations that contributed troops pledged that 
they should be “united and prompted to 
resist” if there was a renewal of the armed 
attack: Joint Policy Declaration Concerning 
the Korean Armistice, July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 
230, T.I.A.S. No. 2781.
27   Law No. 113 of 2001 (Japan) (expired in 
2007 after extended three times); Law No. 
137 of 2003 (Japan) (expired in 2009 after 
extended once).
28   Prior consultation is required for any 
military use of facilities and areas in Japan for 
the purpose of contributing to the security of 
Japan and the maintenance of international 
peace and security in the Far East, except 
when the U.S. takes action in self-defence 
under Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty. See Exchange of Notes Regarding 
the Implementation of Article VI of Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
Japan and the United States of America, 
42 Dep’t St. Bull. 198 (1960) (in which both 
114     Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
parties shared understanding that “[m]ajor 
changes in the deployment into Japan of 
United States armed forces, major changes in 
their equipment, and the use of facilities and 
areas in Japan as bases for military combat 
operations to be undertaken from Japan oth-
er than those conducted under Article V of 
the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior 




絆) [The Bonds of the Japan-U.S. Alliance] 
257–66 (2000).
30   See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. 
Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, 
¶ 74 (Dec. 13); Dispute between Argentina 
and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, 21 
R.I.A.A. 53, ¶ 169 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1977).
31   SDF Law, supra note 18, arts. 82.3, 93.3.
32   Id. arts. 84.3, 94.5.
33   Id. arts. 84.4, 94.6.
34   Id. art. 95.
35   Id. art. 95.2 (as amended by Law No. 76 
of 2015). 
36   Law No. 45 of 1907 (Japan).
37   Law Concerning Measures to Ensure 
Peace and Security of Japan in Situations 
that Constitutes Grave Circumstances Affect-
ing Japan, Law No. 60 of 1999, as amended 
by Law No. 76 of 2015 (Japan) [hereinafter 
Law Concerning Grave Circumstances], arts. 
1, 2(3), 11; SDF Law, supra note 18, arts. 
84.5, 94.7.
38   Report of the Advisory Panel on the 
Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security 
7 (2008), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
39   SDF Law, supra note 18, art. 95.2.
40   Law Concerning Grave Circumstances, 
supra note 37, arts. 1, 2(3), 11; SDF Law, 
supra note 18, arts. 84.5, 94.7.
41   SDF Law, supra note 18, arts. 76, 88.
42   Law No. 45 of 1907 (Japan).
43   Remarks before the Budget Committee 
of the House of Counsellors, supra note 24, 
at 12.
44   Law Concerning Grave Circumstances, 
supra note 37, art. 2(3).
45   Remarks before the Special Committee 
of the House of Councillors on the Bills for 
Peace and Security of Japan and the Interna-
Record of Proceedings, No. 11, at 5 (Aug. 
21, 2015).
46   Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the 
Maritime Boundary between Guyana and 
Suriname (Guy. v. Sur.), Award, 30 R.I.A.A. 
1, ¶ 445 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007); M/V Saiga 
(No. 2) (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. 
Guinea), Judgment of July 1, 1999, 3 ITLOS 
Rep. 10, ¶ 155; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain 
v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 432, ¶ 
84 (Dec. 4); S.S. “I’m Alone” (Can. v. U.S.), 
Final Award, 3 R.I.A.A. 1609, 1617 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1935). See also Agreement for the Im-
plementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conser-
vation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 
22(1)(f), Dec. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3. 
47   SDF Law, supra note 18, art. 84.3(2). 
48   Id. art. 84.3(1).
49   U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publica-
tion 3-68 on Noncombatant Evacuation Op-
erations, Appendix B Legal Considerations ¶ 
f(2) (2015).
50   See, e.g., Tom RuyRuys, ‘Armed Attack’ 
and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions 
in Customary Law and Practice 213–43 
(2011). 
51   Note that the SDF would also be subject 
to South Korean jurisdiction unless Japan has 
concluded a status of force agreement with 
South Korea with a view to enabling the SDF 
to operate without facing criminal liability for 
their actions during rescue and evacuation 
operations. 
Japan’s Legal Readiness in the Event of Hostilities on the Korean Peninsula    115
52   Common Article 1 to the Convention 
for The Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3. For the customary interna-
tional law status, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
& Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law r. 139 (2005), as 
updated by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) at https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home.
53   Commentary on the First Geneva Con-
vention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field ¶¶ 169–72 (Knut 
Philip Spoerri eds., 2016).
54   United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea art. 98(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC]; International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. V, 
Regulation 10(a), Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 
278.
55   International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights arts. 2, 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
56   LOSC, supra note 54, art. 110. Cf. 
Medvedyev and Others v. France, App. 
No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 67 (2010) 
Winner and its crew were within the jurisdic-
tion of France for having exercised, de facto, 
full and exclusive control over them).
57   Law Concerning the Implementation of 
Ship Inspection Activities in Situations that 
Constitute Grave Circumstances Affecting 
Japan, Law No. 45 of 2000 (Japan), arts. 2, 6 
(amended by Law No. 76 of 2015).
58   For the author’s analysis of the challeng-
es posed to the implementation of interna-
tional humanitarian law by hybrid warfare 
employed in the maritime context, see Hi-
toshi Nasu, Challenges of Hybrid Warfare to 
the Implementation of International Human-
, in 
Perspectives on International Humanitarian 
& Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2019).
59   See, e.g., Masasuke Ohmori, First Dir. of 
Cabinet Legislative Bureau, Remarks before 
the Special Security Committee, 120th Diet 
at 26 (Mar. 13, 1991).
